Update dependencies

vendor/tailscale.com/control/controlbase/conn.go

@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
+// Package controlbase implements the base transport of the Tailscale
+// 2021 control protocol.
+//
+// The base transport implements Noise IK, instantiated with
+// Curve25519, ChaCha20Poly1305 and BLAKE2s.
+package controlbase
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s"
+	chp "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
+	"tailscale.com/types/key"
+)
+
+const (
+	// maxMessageSize is the maximum size of a protocol frame on the
+	// wire, including header and payload.
+	maxMessageSize = 4096
+	// maxCiphertextSize is the maximum amount of ciphertext bytes
+	// that one protocol frame can carry, after framing.
+	maxCiphertextSize = maxMessageSize - 3
+	// maxPlaintextSize is the maximum amount of plaintext bytes that
+	// one protocol frame can carry, after encryption and framing.
+	maxPlaintextSize = maxCiphertextSize - chp.Overhead
+)
+
+// A Conn is a secured Noise connection. It implements the net.Conn
+// interface, with the unusual trait that any write error (including a
+// SetWriteDeadline induced i/o timeout) causes all future writes to
+// fail.
+type Conn struct {
+	conn          net.Conn
+	version       uint16
+	peer          key.MachinePublic
+	handshakeHash [blake2s.Size]byte
+	rx            rxState
+	tx            txState
+}
+
+// rxState is all the Conn state that Read uses.
+type rxState struct {
+	sync.Mutex
+	cipher    cipher.AEAD
+	nonce     nonce
+	buf       *maxMsgBuffer   // or nil when reads exhausted
+	n         int             // number of valid bytes in buf
+	next      int             // offset of next undecrypted packet
+	plaintext []byte          // slice into buf of decrypted bytes
+	hdrBuf    [headerLen]byte // small buffer used when buf is nil
+}
+
+// txState is all the Conn state that Write uses.
+type txState struct {
+	sync.Mutex
+	cipher cipher.AEAD
+	nonce  nonce
+	err    error // records the first partial write error for all future calls
+}
+
+// ProtocolVersion returns the protocol version that was used to
+// establish this Conn.
+func (c *Conn) ProtocolVersion() int {
+	return int(c.version)
+}
+
+// HandshakeHash returns the Noise handshake hash for the connection,
+// which can be used to bind other messages to this connection
+// (i.e. to ensure that the message wasn't replayed from a different
+// connection).
+func (c *Conn) HandshakeHash() [blake2s.Size]byte {
+	return c.handshakeHash
+}
+
+// Peer returns the peer's long-term public key.
+func (c *Conn) Peer() key.MachinePublic {
+	return c.peer
+}
+
+// readNLocked reads into c.rx.buf until buf contains at least total
+// bytes. Returns a slice of the total bytes in rxBuf, or an
+// error if fewer than total bytes are available.
+//
+// It may be called with a nil c.rx.buf only if total == headerLen.
+//
+// On success, c.rx.buf will be non-nil.
+func (c *Conn) readNLocked(total int) ([]byte, error) {
+	if total > maxMessageSize {
+		return nil, errReadTooBig{total}
+	}
+	for {
+		if total <= c.rx.n {
+			return c.rx.buf[:total], nil
+		}
+		var n int
+		var err error
+		if c.rx.buf == nil {
+			if c.rx.n != 0 || total != headerLen {
+				panic("unexpected")
+			}
+			// Optimization to reduce memory usage.
+			// Most connections are blocked forever waiting for
+			// a read, so we don't want c.rx.buf to be allocated until
+			// we know there's data to read. Instead, when we're
+			// waiting for data to arrive here, read into the
+			// 3 byte hdrBuf:
+			n, err = c.conn.Read(c.rx.hdrBuf[:])
+			if n > 0 {
+				c.rx.buf = getMaxMsgBuffer()
+				copy(c.rx.buf[:], c.rx.hdrBuf[:n])
+			}
+		} else {
+			n, err = c.conn.Read(c.rx.buf[c.rx.n:])
+		}
+		c.rx.n += n
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// decryptLocked decrypts msg (which is header+ciphertext) in-place
+// and sets c.rx.plaintext to the decrypted bytes.
+func (c *Conn) decryptLocked(msg []byte) (err error) {
+	if msgType := msg[0]; msgType != msgTypeRecord {
+		return fmt.Errorf("received message with unexpected type %d, want %d", msgType, msgTypeRecord)
+	}
+	// We don't check the length field here, because the caller
+	// already did in order to figure out how big the msg slice should
+	// be.
+	ciphertext := msg[headerLen:]
+
+	if !c.rx.nonce.Valid() {
+		return errCipherExhausted{}
+	}
+
+	c.rx.plaintext, err = c.rx.cipher.Open(ciphertext[:0], c.rx.nonce[:], ciphertext, nil)
+	c.rx.nonce.Increment()
+
+	if err != nil {
+		// Once a decryption has failed, our Conn is no longer
+		// synchronized with our peer. Nuke the cipher state to be
+		// safe, so that no further decryptions are attempted. Future
+		// read attempts will return net.ErrClosed.
+		c.rx.cipher = nil
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
+// encryptLocked encrypts plaintext into buf (including the
+// packet header) and returns a slice of the ciphertext, or an error
+// if the cipher is exhausted (i.e. can no longer be used safely).
+func (c *Conn) encryptLocked(plaintext []byte, buf *maxMsgBuffer) ([]byte, error) {
+	if !c.tx.nonce.Valid() {
+		// Received 2^64-1 messages on this cipher state. Connection
+		// is no longer usable.
+		return nil, errCipherExhausted{}
+	}
+
+	buf[0] = msgTypeRecord
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(buf[1:headerLen], uint16(len(plaintext)+chp.Overhead))
+	ret := c.tx.cipher.Seal(buf[:headerLen], c.tx.nonce[:], plaintext, nil)
+	c.tx.nonce.Increment()
+
+	return ret, nil
+}
+
+// wholeMessageLocked returns a slice of one whole Noise transport
+// message from c.rx.buf, if one whole message is available, and
+// advances the read state to the next Noise message in the
+// buffer. Returns nil without advancing read state if there isn't one
+// whole message in c.rx.buf.
+func (c *Conn) wholeMessageLocked() []byte {
+	available := c.rx.n - c.rx.next
+	if available < headerLen {
+		return nil
+	}
+	bs := c.rx.buf[c.rx.next:c.rx.n]
+	totalSize := headerLen + int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(bs[1:3]))
+	if len(bs) < totalSize {
+		return nil
+	}
+	c.rx.next += totalSize
+	return bs[:totalSize]
+}
+
+// decryptOneLocked decrypts one Noise transport message, reading from
+// c.conn as needed, and sets c.rx.plaintext to point to the decrypted
+// bytes. c.rx.plaintext is only valid if err == nil.
+func (c *Conn) decryptOneLocked() error {
+	c.rx.plaintext = nil
+
+	// Fast path: do we have one whole ciphertext frame buffered
+	// already?
+	if bs := c.wholeMessageLocked(); bs != nil {
+		return c.decryptLocked(bs)
+	}
+
+	if c.rx.next != 0 {
+		// To simplify the read logic, move the remainder of the
+		// buffered bytes back to the head of the buffer, so we can
+		// grow it without worrying about wraparound.
+		c.rx.n = copy(c.rx.buf[:], c.rx.buf[c.rx.next:c.rx.n])
+		c.rx.next = 0
+	}
+
+	// Return our buffer to the pool if it's empty, lest we be
+	// blocked in a long Read call, reading the 3 byte header. We
+	// don't to keep that buffer unnecessarily alive.
+	if c.rx.n == 0 && c.rx.next == 0 && c.rx.buf != nil {
+		bufPool.Put(c.rx.buf)
+		c.rx.buf = nil
+	}
+
+	bs, err := c.readNLocked(headerLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// The rest of the header (besides the length field) gets verified
+	// in decryptLocked, not here.
+	messageLen := headerLen + int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(bs[1:3]))
+	bs, err = c.readNLocked(messageLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.rx.next = len(bs)
+
+	return c.decryptLocked(bs)
+}
+
+// Read implements io.Reader.
+func (c *Conn) Read(bs []byte) (int, error) {
+	c.rx.Lock()
+	defer c.rx.Unlock()
+
+	if c.rx.cipher == nil {
+		return 0, net.ErrClosed
+	}
+	// If no plaintext is buffered, decrypt incoming frames until we
+	// have some plaintext. Zero-byte Noise frames are allowed in this
+	// protocol, which is why we have to loop here rather than decrypt
+	// a single additional frame.
+	for len(c.rx.plaintext) == 0 {
+		if err := c.decryptOneLocked(); err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+	}
+	n := copy(bs, c.rx.plaintext)
+	c.rx.plaintext = c.rx.plaintext[n:]
+
+	// Lose slice's underlying array pointer to unneeded memory so
+	// GC can collect more.
+	if len(c.rx.plaintext) == 0 {
+		c.rx.plaintext = nil
+	}
+	return n, nil
+}
+
+// Write implements io.Writer.
+func (c *Conn) Write(bs []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	c.tx.Lock()
+	defer c.tx.Unlock()
+
+	if c.tx.err != nil {
+		return 0, c.tx.err
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err != nil {
+			// All write errors are fatal for this conn, so clear the
+			// cipher state whenever an error happens.
+			c.tx.cipher = nil
+		}
+		if c.tx.err == nil {
+			// Only set c.tx.err if not nil so that we can return one
+			// error on the first failure, and a different one for
+			// subsequent calls. See the error handling around Write
+			// below for why.
+			c.tx.err = err
+		}
+	}()
+
+	if c.tx.cipher == nil {
+		return 0, net.ErrClosed
+	}
+
+	buf := getMaxMsgBuffer()
+	defer bufPool.Put(buf)
+
+	var sent int
+	for len(bs) > 0 {
+		toSend := bs
+		if len(toSend) > maxPlaintextSize {
+			toSend = bs[:maxPlaintextSize]
+		}
+		bs = bs[len(toSend):]
+
+		ciphertext, err := c.encryptLocked(toSend, buf)
+		if err != nil {
+			return sent, err
+		}
+		if _, err := c.conn.Write(ciphertext); err != nil {
+			// Return the raw error on the Write that actually
+			// failed. For future writes, return that error wrapped in
+			// a desync error.
+			c.tx.err = errPartialWrite{err}
+			return sent, err
+		}
+		sent += len(toSend)
+	}
+	return sent, nil
+}
+
+// Close implements io.Closer.
+func (c *Conn) Close() error {
+	closeErr := c.conn.Close() // unblocks any waiting reads or writes
+
+	// Remove references to live cipher state. Strictly speaking this
+	// is unnecessary, but we want to try and hand the active cipher
+	// state to the garbage collector promptly, to preserve perfect
+	// forward secrecy as much as we can.
+	c.rx.Lock()
+	c.rx.cipher = nil
+	c.rx.Unlock()
+	c.tx.Lock()
+	c.tx.cipher = nil
+	c.tx.Unlock()
+	return closeErr
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) LocalAddr() net.Addr                { return c.conn.LocalAddr() }
+func (c *Conn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr               { return c.conn.RemoteAddr() }
+func (c *Conn) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error      { return c.conn.SetDeadline(t) }
+func (c *Conn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error  { return c.conn.SetReadDeadline(t) }
+func (c *Conn) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { return c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(t) }
+
+// errCipherExhausted is the error returned when we run out of nonces
+// on a cipher.
+type errCipherExhausted struct{}
+
+func (errCipherExhausted) Error() string {
+	return "cipher exhausted, no more nonces available for current key"
+}
+func (errCipherExhausted) Timeout() bool   { return false }
+func (errCipherExhausted) Temporary() bool { return false }
+
+// errPartialWrite is the error returned when the cipher state has
+// become unusable due to a past partial write.
+type errPartialWrite struct {
+	err error
+}
+
+func (e errPartialWrite) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("cipher state desynchronized due to partial write (%v)", e.err)
+}
+func (e errPartialWrite) Unwrap() error   { return e.err }
+func (e errPartialWrite) Temporary() bool { return false }
+func (e errPartialWrite) Timeout() bool   { return false }
+
+// errReadTooBig is the error returned when the peer sent an
+// unacceptably large Noise frame.
+type errReadTooBig struct {
+	requested int
+}
+
+func (e errReadTooBig) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("requested read of %d bytes exceeds max allowed Noise frame size", e.requested)
+}
+func (e errReadTooBig) Temporary() bool {
+	// permanent error because this error only occurs when our peer
+	// sends us a frame so large we're unwilling to ever decode it.
+	return false
+}
+func (e errReadTooBig) Timeout() bool { return false }
+
+type nonce [chp.NonceSize]byte
+
+func (n *nonce) Valid() bool {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(n[:4]) == 0 && binary.BigEndian.Uint64(n[4:]) != invalidNonce
+}
+
+func (n *nonce) Increment() {
+	if !n.Valid() {
+		panic("increment of invalid nonce")
+	}
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(n[4:], 1+binary.BigEndian.Uint64(n[4:]))
+}
+
+type maxMsgBuffer [maxMessageSize]byte
+
+// bufPool holds the temporary buffers for Conn.Read & Write.
+var bufPool = &sync.Pool{
+	New: func() any {
+		return new(maxMsgBuffer)
+	},
+}
+
+func getMaxMsgBuffer() *maxMsgBuffer {
+	return bufPool.Get().(*maxMsgBuffer)
+}

vendor/tailscale.com/control/controlbase/handshake.go

@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@
+// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
+package controlbase
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"net"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"go4.org/mem"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s"
+	chp "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
+	"tailscale.com/types/key"
+)
+
+const (
+	// protocolName is the name of the specific instantiation of Noise
+	// that the control protocol uses. This string's value is fixed by
+	// the Noise spec, and shouldn't be changed unless we're updating
+	// the control protocol to use a different Noise instance.
+	protocolName = "Noise_IK_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s"
+	// protocolVersion is the version of the control protocol that
+	// Client will use when initiating a handshake.
+	//protocolVersion uint16 = 1
+	// protocolVersionPrefix is the name portion of the protocol
+	// name+version string that gets mixed into the handshake as a
+	// prologue.
+	//
+	// This mixing verifies that both clients agree that they're
+	// executing the control protocol at a specific version that
+	// matches the advertised version in the cleartext packet header.
+	protocolVersionPrefix = "Tailscale Control Protocol v"
+	invalidNonce          = ^uint64(0)
+)
+
+func protocolVersionPrologue(version uint16) []byte {
+	ret := make([]byte, 0, len(protocolVersionPrefix)+5) // 5 bytes is enough to encode all possible version numbers.
+	ret = append(ret, protocolVersionPrefix...)
+	return strconv.AppendUint(ret, uint64(version), 10)
+}
+
+// HandshakeContinuation upgrades a net.Conn to a Conn. The net.Conn
+// is assumed to have already sent the client>server handshake
+// initiation message.
+type HandshakeContinuation func(context.Context, net.Conn) (*Conn, error)
+
+// ClientDeferred initiates a control client handshake, returning the
+// initial message to send to the server and a continuation to
+// finalize the handshake.
+//
+// ClientDeferred is split in this way for RTT reduction: we run this
+// protocol after negotiating a protocol switch from HTTP/HTTPS. If we
+// completely serialized the negotiation followed by the handshake,
+// we'd pay an extra RTT to transmit the handshake initiation after
+// protocol switching. By splitting the handshake into an initial
+// message and a continuation, we can embed the handshake initiation
+// into the HTTP protocol switching request and avoid a bit of delay.
+func ClientDeferred(machineKey key.MachinePrivate, controlKey key.MachinePublic, protocolVersion uint16) (initialHandshake []byte, continueHandshake HandshakeContinuation, err error) {
+	var s symmetricState
+	s.Initialize()
+
+	// prologue
+	s.MixHash(protocolVersionPrologue(protocolVersion))
+
+	// <- s
+	// ...
+	s.MixHash(controlKey.UntypedBytes())
+
+	// -> e, es, s, ss
+	init := mkInitiationMessage(protocolVersion)
+	machineEphemeral := key.NewMachine()
+	machineEphemeralPub := machineEphemeral.Public()
+	copy(init.EphemeralPub(), machineEphemeralPub.UntypedBytes())
+	s.MixHash(machineEphemeralPub.UntypedBytes())
+	cipher, err := s.MixDH(machineEphemeral, controlKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("computing es: %w", err)
+	}
+	machineKeyPub := machineKey.Public()
+	s.EncryptAndHash(cipher, init.MachinePub(), machineKeyPub.UntypedBytes())
+	cipher, err = s.MixDH(machineKey, controlKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("computing ss: %w", err)
+	}
+	s.EncryptAndHash(cipher, init.Tag(), nil) // empty message payload
+
+	cont := func(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn) (*Conn, error) {
+		return continueClientHandshake(ctx, conn, &s, machineKey, machineEphemeral, controlKey, protocolVersion)
+	}
+	return init[:], cont, nil
+}
+
+// Client wraps ClientDeferred and immediately invokes the returned
+// continuation with conn.
+//
+// This is a helper for when you don't need the fancy
+// continuation-style handshake, and just want to synchronously
+// upgrade a net.Conn to a secure transport.
+func Client(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn, machineKey key.MachinePrivate, controlKey key.MachinePublic, protocolVersion uint16) (*Conn, error) {
+	init, cont, err := ClientDeferred(machineKey, controlKey, protocolVersion)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if _, err := conn.Write(init); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return cont(ctx, conn)
+}
+
+func continueClientHandshake(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn, s *symmetricState, machineKey, machineEphemeral key.MachinePrivate, controlKey key.MachinePublic, protocolVersion uint16) (*Conn, error) {
+	// No matter what, this function can only run once per s. Ensure
+	// attempted reuse causes a panic.
+	defer func() {
+		s.finished = true
+	}()
+
+	if deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline(); ok {
+		if err := conn.SetDeadline(deadline); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("setting conn deadline: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer func() {
+			conn.SetDeadline(time.Time{})
+		}()
+	}
+
+	// Read in the payload and look for errors/protocol violations from the server.
+	var resp responseMessage
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, resp.Header()); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading response header: %w", err)
+	}
+	if resp.Type() != msgTypeResponse {
+		if resp.Type() != msgTypeError {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected response message type %d", resp.Type())
+		}
+		msg := make([]byte, resp.Length())
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, msg); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("server error: %q", msg)
+	}
+	if resp.Length() != len(resp.Payload()) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("wrong length %d received for handshake response", resp.Length())
+	}
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, resp.Payload()); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// <- e, ee, se
+	controlEphemeralPub := key.MachinePublicFromRaw32(mem.B(resp.EphemeralPub()))
+	s.MixHash(controlEphemeralPub.UntypedBytes())
+	if _, err := s.MixDH(machineEphemeral, controlEphemeralPub); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("computing ee: %w", err)
+	}
+	cipher, err := s.MixDH(machineKey, controlEphemeralPub)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("computing se: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.DecryptAndHash(cipher, nil, resp.Tag()); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypting payload: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	c1, c2, err := s.Split()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("finalizing handshake: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	c := &Conn{
+		conn:          conn,
+		version:       protocolVersion,
+		peer:          controlKey,
+		handshakeHash: s.h,
+		tx: txState{
+			cipher: c1,
+		},
+		rx: rxState{
+			cipher: c2,
+		},
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+// Server initiates a control server handshake, returning the resulting
+// control connection.
+//
+// optionalInit can be the client's initial handshake message as
+// returned by ClientDeferred, or nil in which case the initial
+// message is read from conn.
+//
+// The context deadline, if any, covers the entire handshaking
+// process.
+func Server(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn, controlKey key.MachinePrivate, optionalInit []byte) (*Conn, error) {
+	if deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline(); ok {
+		if err := conn.SetDeadline(deadline); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("setting conn deadline: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer func() {
+			conn.SetDeadline(time.Time{})
+		}()
+	}
+
+	// Deliberately does not support formatting, so that we don't echo
+	// attacker-controlled input back to them.
+	sendErr := func(msg string) error {
+		if len(msg) >= 1<<16 {
+			msg = msg[:1<<16]
+		}
+		var hdr [headerLen]byte
+		hdr[0] = msgTypeError
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[1:3], uint16(len(msg)))
+		if _, err := conn.Write(hdr[:]); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("sending %q error to client: %w", msg, err)
+		}
+		if _, err := io.WriteString(conn, msg); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("sending %q error to client: %w", msg, err)
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("refused client handshake: %q", msg)
+	}
+
+	var s symmetricState
+	s.Initialize()
+
+	var init initiationMessage
+	if optionalInit != nil {
+		if len(optionalInit) != len(init) {
+			return nil, sendErr("wrong handshake initiation size")
+		}
+		copy(init[:], optionalInit)
+	} else if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, init.Header()); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// Just a rename to make it more obvious what the value is. In the
+	// current implementation we don't need to block any protocol
+	// versions at this layer, it's safe to let the handshake proceed
+	// and then let the caller make decisions based on the agreed-upon
+	// protocol version.
+	clientVersion := init.Version()
+	if init.Type() != msgTypeInitiation {
+		return nil, sendErr("unexpected handshake message type")
+	}
+	if init.Length() != len(init.Payload()) {
+		return nil, sendErr("wrong handshake initiation length")
+	}
+	// if optionalInit was provided, we have the payload already.
+	if optionalInit == nil {
+		if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, init.Payload()); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// prologue. Can only do this once we at least think the client is
+	// handshaking using a supported version.
+	s.MixHash(protocolVersionPrologue(clientVersion))
+
+	// <- s
+	// ...
+	controlKeyPub := controlKey.Public()
+	s.MixHash(controlKeyPub.UntypedBytes())
+
+	// -> e, es, s, ss
+	machineEphemeralPub := key.MachinePublicFromRaw32(mem.B(init.EphemeralPub()))
+	s.MixHash(machineEphemeralPub.UntypedBytes())
+	cipher, err := s.MixDH(controlKey, machineEphemeralPub)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("computing es: %w", err)
+	}
+	var machineKeyBytes [32]byte
+	if err := s.DecryptAndHash(cipher, machineKeyBytes[:], init.MachinePub()); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypting machine key: %w", err)
+	}
+	machineKey := key.MachinePublicFromRaw32(mem.B(machineKeyBytes[:]))
+	cipher, err = s.MixDH(controlKey, machineKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("computing ss: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.DecryptAndHash(cipher, nil, init.Tag()); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypting initiation tag: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// <- e, ee, se
+	resp := mkResponseMessage()
+	controlEphemeral := key.NewMachine()
+	controlEphemeralPub := controlEphemeral.Public()
+	copy(resp.EphemeralPub(), controlEphemeralPub.UntypedBytes())
+	s.MixHash(controlEphemeralPub.UntypedBytes())
+	if _, err := s.MixDH(controlEphemeral, machineEphemeralPub); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("computing ee: %w", err)
+	}
+	cipher, err = s.MixDH(controlEphemeral, machineKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("computing se: %w", err)
+	}
+	s.EncryptAndHash(cipher, resp.Tag(), nil) // empty message payload
+
+	c1, c2, err := s.Split()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("finalizing handshake: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := conn.Write(resp[:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	c := &Conn{
+		conn:          conn,
+		version:       clientVersion,
+		peer:          machineKey,
+		handshakeHash: s.h,
+		tx: txState{
+			cipher: c2,
+		},
+		rx: rxState{
+			cipher: c1,
+		},
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+// symmetricState contains the state of an in-flight handshake.
+type symmetricState struct {
+	finished bool
+
+	h  [blake2s.Size]byte // hash of currently-processed handshake state
+	ck [blake2s.Size]byte // chaining key used to construct session keys at the end of the handshake
+}
+
+func (s *symmetricState) checkFinished() {
+	if s.finished {
+		panic("attempted to use symmetricState after Split was called")
+	}
+}
+
+// Initialize sets s to the initial handshake state, prior to
+// processing any handshake messages.
+func (s *symmetricState) Initialize() {
+	s.checkFinished()
+	s.h = blake2s.Sum256([]byte(protocolName))
+	s.ck = s.h
+}
+
+// MixHash updates s.h to be BLAKE2s(s.h || data), where || is
+// concatenation.
+func (s *symmetricState) MixHash(data []byte) {
+	s.checkFinished()
+	h := newBLAKE2s()
+	h.Write(s.h[:])
+	h.Write(data)
+	h.Sum(s.h[:0])
+}
+
+// MixDH updates s.ck with the result of X25519(priv, pub) and returns
+// a singleUseCHP that can be used to encrypt or decrypt handshake
+// data.
+//
+// MixDH corresponds to MixKey(X25519(...))) in the spec. Implementing
+// it as a single function allows for strongly-typed arguments that
+// reduce the risk of error in the caller (e.g. invoking X25519 with
+// two private keys, or two public keys), and thus producing the wrong
+// calculation.
+func (s *symmetricState) MixDH(priv key.MachinePrivate, pub key.MachinePublic) (*singleUseCHP, error) {
+	s.checkFinished()
+	keyData, err := curve25519.X25519(priv.UntypedBytes(), pub.UntypedBytes())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("computing X25519: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	r := hkdf.New(newBLAKE2s, keyData, s.ck[:], nil)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.ck[:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("extracting ck: %w", err)
+	}
+	var k [chp.KeySize]byte
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, k[:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("extracting k: %w", err)
+	}
+	return newSingleUseCHP(k), nil
+}
+
+// EncryptAndHash encrypts plaintext into ciphertext (which must be
+// the correct size to hold the encrypted plaintext) using cipher,
+// mixes the ciphertext into s.h, and returns the ciphertext.
+func (s *symmetricState) EncryptAndHash(cipher *singleUseCHP, ciphertext, plaintext []byte) {
+	s.checkFinished()
+	if len(ciphertext) != len(plaintext)+chp.Overhead {
+		panic("ciphertext is wrong size for given plaintext")
+	}
+	ret := cipher.Seal(ciphertext[:0], plaintext, s.h[:])
+	s.MixHash(ret)
+}
+
+// DecryptAndHash decrypts the given ciphertext into plaintext (which
+// must be the correct size to hold the decrypted ciphertext) using
+// cipher. If decryption is successful, it mixes the ciphertext into
+// s.h.
+func (s *symmetricState) DecryptAndHash(cipher *singleUseCHP, plaintext, ciphertext []byte) error {
+	s.checkFinished()
+	if len(ciphertext) != len(plaintext)+chp.Overhead {
+		return errors.New("plaintext is wrong size for given ciphertext")
+	}
+	if _, err := cipher.Open(plaintext[:0], ciphertext, s.h[:]); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	s.MixHash(ciphertext)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Split returns two ChaCha20Poly1305 ciphers with keys derived from
+// the current handshake state. Methods on s cannot be used again
+// after calling Split.
+func (s *symmetricState) Split() (c1, c2 cipher.AEAD, err error) {
+	s.finished = true
+
+	var k1, k2 [chp.KeySize]byte
+	r := hkdf.New(newBLAKE2s, nil, s.ck[:], nil)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, k1[:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("extracting k1: %w", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, k2[:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("extracting k2: %w", err)
+	}
+	c1, err = chp.New(k1[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("constructing AEAD c1: %w", err)
+	}
+	c2, err = chp.New(k2[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("constructing AEAD c2: %w", err)
+	}
+	return c1, c2, nil
+}
+
+// newBLAKE2s returns a hash.Hash implementing BLAKE2s, or panics on
+// error.
+func newBLAKE2s() hash.Hash {
+	h, err := blake2s.New256(nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		// Should never happen, errors only happen when using BLAKE2s
+		// in MAC mode with a key.
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	return h
+}
+
+// newCHP returns a cipher.AEAD implementing ChaCha20Poly1305, or
+// panics on error.
+func newCHP(key [chp.KeySize]byte) cipher.AEAD {
+	aead, err := chp.New(key[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		// Can only happen if we passed a key of the wrong length. The
+		// function signature prevents that.
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	return aead
+}
+
+// singleUseCHP is an instance of ChaCha20Poly1305 that can be used
+// only once, either for encrypting or decrypting, but not both. The
+// chosen operation is always executed with an all-zeros
+// nonce. Subsequent calls to either Seal or Open panic.
+type singleUseCHP struct {
+	c cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+func newSingleUseCHP(key [chp.KeySize]byte) *singleUseCHP {
+	return &singleUseCHP{newCHP(key)}
+}
+
+func (c *singleUseCHP) Seal(dst, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
+	if c.c == nil {
+		panic("Attempted reuse of singleUseAEAD")
+	}
+	cipher := c.c
+	c.c = nil
+	var nonce [chp.NonceSize]byte
+	return cipher.Seal(dst, nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
+}
+
+func (c *singleUseCHP) Open(dst, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if c.c == nil {
+		panic("Attempted reuse of singleUseAEAD")
+	}
+	cipher := c.c
+	c.c = nil
+	var nonce [chp.NonceSize]byte
+	return cipher.Open(dst, nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
+}

vendor/tailscale.com/control/controlbase/messages.go

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// Copyright (c) Tailscale Inc & AUTHORS
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
+package controlbase
+
+import "encoding/binary"
+
+const (
+	// msgTypeInitiation frames carry a Noise IK handshake initiation message.
+	msgTypeInitiation = 1
+	// msgTypeResponse frames carry a Noise IK handshake response message.
+	msgTypeResponse = 2
+	// msgTypeError frames carry an unauthenticated human-readable
+	// error message.
+	//
+	// Errors reported in this message type must be treated as public
+	// hints only. They are not encrypted or authenticated, and so can
+	// be seen and tampered with on the wire.
+	msgTypeError = 3
+	// msgTypeRecord frames carry session data bytes.
+	msgTypeRecord = 4
+
+	// headerLen is the size of the header on all messages except msgTypeInitiation.
+	headerLen = 3
+	// initiationHeaderLen is the size of the header on all msgTypeInitiation messages.
+	initiationHeaderLen = 5
+)
+
+// initiationMessage is the protocol message sent from a client
+// machine to a control server.
+//
+// 2b: protocol version
+// 1b: message type (0x01)
+// 2b: payload length (96)
+// 5b: header (see headerLen for fields)
+// 32b: client ephemeral public key (cleartext)
+// 48b: client machine public key (encrypted)
+// 16b: message tag (authenticates the whole message)
+type initiationMessage [101]byte
+
+func mkInitiationMessage(protocolVersion uint16) initiationMessage {
+	var ret initiationMessage
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ret[:2], protocolVersion)
+	ret[2] = msgTypeInitiation
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ret[3:5], uint16(len(ret.Payload())))
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (m *initiationMessage) Header() []byte  { return m[:initiationHeaderLen] }
+func (m *initiationMessage) Payload() []byte { return m[initiationHeaderLen:] }
+
+func (m *initiationMessage) Version() uint16 { return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(m[:2]) }
+func (m *initiationMessage) Type() byte      { return m[2] }
+func (m *initiationMessage) Length() int     { return int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(m[3:5])) }
+
+func (m *initiationMessage) EphemeralPub() []byte {
+	return m[initiationHeaderLen : initiationHeaderLen+32]
+}
+func (m *initiationMessage) MachinePub() []byte {
+	return m[initiationHeaderLen+32 : initiationHeaderLen+32+48]
+}
+func (m *initiationMessage) Tag() []byte { return m[initiationHeaderLen+32+48:] }
+
+// responseMessage is the protocol message sent from a control server
+// to a client machine.
+//
+// 1b: message type (0x02)
+// 2b: payload length (48)
+// 32b: control ephemeral public key (cleartext)
+// 16b: message tag (authenticates the whole message)
+type responseMessage [51]byte
+
+func mkResponseMessage() responseMessage {
+	var ret responseMessage
+	ret[0] = msgTypeResponse
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ret[1:], uint16(len(ret.Payload())))
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (m *responseMessage) Header() []byte  { return m[:headerLen] }
+func (m *responseMessage) Payload() []byte { return m[headerLen:] }
+
+func (m *responseMessage) Type() byte  { return m[0] }
+func (m *responseMessage) Length() int { return int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(m[1:3])) }
+
+func (m *responseMessage) EphemeralPub() []byte { return m[headerLen : headerLen+32] }
+func (m *responseMessage) Tag() []byte          { return m[headerLen+32:] }